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NOTE
Are Union-Financed Legal Services Provided Prior to a
Representation Election an Impermissible Grant of Benefit?:
An Analysis of Nestle, Novotel, and Freund
Employees commonly decide whether to be represented by labor
unions through elections conducted by the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB or the "Board").' Campaigns leading up to the
elections usually involve attempts to influence employees to vote for
or against the union, and in many campaigns, unions and employers
each spend considerable resources in an attempt to achieve favorable
election results. In reviewing the validity of an election, the Board
and reviewing courts3 closely examine the conduct of the employer,
employees, and unions that occurred during the "critical period"-the
1. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1994); THEODORE J. ST. ANTOINE ET AL., LABOR
RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 285-95 (10th ed. 1999). The National Labor
Relations Act requires employees, a union, or an employer to submit a petition to the
Board requesting an election. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c). The employer may submit a
petition for a Board representation election only upon notification that employees or a
union desire to unionize. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B). Employees may choose among
one or more competing labor organizations or decide to forgo union representation. If a
majority of voting employees chooses a union, and if the Board upholds the election result
against appeals, then the Board will certify the union as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees. See id. Conversely, if a majority of voters opts for no
union representation, and if the Board upholds the election, then the employees will
remain unrepresented. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(a) (1994), 159(c)(1)(B). If two or more
unions compete in the election, and if no option (including the choice of no
representation) garners a majority, then the Board will conduct a runoff election between
the two options that received the most votes. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3).
2. See, e.g., Novotel N.Y., 321 N.L.R.B. 624, 624-25 (1996) (noting the statement by
a union official that "an organizing campaign required significant union resources, and
that the [union] would probably be reluctant to engage in another organizing drive" at the
employer's workplace). In a nonunionized workplace, much is at stake because the
outcome of an election might determine the future course of labor-management relations
not only at that specific site but also at other work sites in the region or in other locations
where companies in the same industry operate. While an employer who has a number of
unorganized workplaces might fear that a successful union campaign at one workplace
might spread to others, a labor union organizing in a largely nonunionized industry might
place special emphasis on a few particularly vulnerable work sites within that industry.
Charles B. Craver, Why Labor Unions Must (and Can) Survive, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 15,38-39 (1998).
3. Parties receiving adverse Board rulings may appeal to federal appeals courts. 29
U.S.C. § 160(f) (1994); see also infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text (discussing the
procedural implications of choosing a particular federal appeals court).
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time between the election request and the vote itself-to determine
whether any acts improperly influenced employees in the exercise of
their freedom to vote.
4
The Board and the courts have drawn a line between permissible
and impermissible goods and services that an employer or labor
organization may provide to employees during the critical period.
5
This distinction ensures that employee votes are "governed only by
consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of unionization...
and not by any extraneous inducements of pecuniary value."6 The
legitimacy of one type of pre-election activity, however, divides the
Board and reviewing courts: union funding of legal services for
employees who file work-related lawsuits during the pre-election
period.7
This Note reviews the case law on pre-election grants of benefits8
and employees' constitutional and statutory rights to receive union
advice and support.9 The Note then discusses Board and court
decisions on the validity of union-supported pre-election suits,
focusing on arguments for and against their use.1" The Note also
describes a procedural maneuver-forum choice-that will frustrate
judicial review of the issue unless the Supreme Court issues a ruling
that ends the disagreement.1 Finally, the Note explores three
alternatives to the filing of a union-financed lawsuit during the critical
period before an election. 2
4. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 453,453-54 (1962) (citing the Board's
definition of the critical period in Ideal Elec. & Mfg. Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 1275, 1278 (1961)).
If the validity of the vote is questioned, the critical period extends through the resolution
of the question of representation, which often includes a subsequent election. See Novotel,
321 N.L.R.B. at 639 (noting that the critical period ends when a valid election is held). For
a discussion of the critical period, see infra notes 149-54 and accompanying text.
5. For a discussion of rulings on critical period activities, see infra notes 13-25 and
accompanying text.
6. NLRB v. L & J Equip. Co., 745 F.2d 224,231 (3d Cir. 1984).
7. Compare Freund Baking Co. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 928, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(holding that the union benefit tainted the representation election), and Nestle Ice Cream
Co. v. NLRB, 46 F.3d 578, 586 (6th Cir. 1995) (same), with Freund Baking Co., 324
N.L.R.B. No. 175, 1997 WL 715828, at *2 (Nov. 7, 1997), enforcement denied, 165 F.3d 928
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that the pre-election suit was permissible), BHY Concrete
Finishing, Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 505, 505 (1997) (same), Novotel, 321 N.L.R.B. at 640-41
(same), and Nestle Dairy Sys., Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 987, 987 (1993), enforcement denied, 46
F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 1995) (same).
8. See infra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 26-136 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 143-55 and accompanying text.
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A brief survey of cases addressing conduct during the critical
period, as well as cases delineating the rights of employees to confer
with labor organizations, will provide an appropriate context in which
to analyze union funding of lawsuits filed before representation
elections. Through a series of cases, the Board and reviewing courts
have generally held that unions or employers bestowing goods or
services worth more than a few dollars that are unrelated to
employment impermissibly taint the representation election.
13  The
Board and the courts also agree that distribution of campaign
propaganda of negligible monetary value, such as buttons, bumper
stickers, and T-shirts, does not impermissibly influence elections so
long as the manner in which the items are given is not objectionable.
4
An employer, however, must not distribute any campaign items,
even those of negligible value, in a manner that tends either to
identify employees who receive or reject them or to pressure
employees to accept the items.'5 The Board and reviewing courts
13. Examples of invalid union benefits that led the Board and the courts to set aside
election results include the following: a waiver of initiation fees to workers who signed a
pre-election document of support, NLRB v. Savair, 414 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1973); payment
of an employee's traffic ticket and court costs, NLRB v. Madisonville Concrete Co., 552
F.2d 168, 170 (6th Cir. 1977); free medical screenings, Mailing Servs., Inc., 293 N.L.R.B.
565, 566 (1989); gifts of sixteen-dollar jackets, Owens-Illinois, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 1235,
1235-36 (1984); five-dollar gift certificates, Gen. Cable Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 1682, 1682-83
(1968); and free life insurance, Wagner Elec. Corp., 167 N.L.R.B. 532, 533 (1967).
Similarly, the Board and the courts have invalidated elections after determining that
employers' pre-election actions impermissibly tainted the results. Examples include an
employer's conferral of enhanced vacation benefits, NLRB v. Exch. Parts Co., 375 U.S.
405, 409 (1964) (noting that "[e]mployees are not likely to miss the inference that the
source of benefits now conferred is also the source from which future benefits must flow
and which may dry up if it is not obliged"); an offer to pay a few hours' wages to off-duty
employees who came to work to vote, Perdue Farms, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 805, 805 (1996);
Broward Co. Health Corp., 320 N.L.R.B. 212, 212-13 (1995); and a company-sponsored
cookout featuring anti-union remarks, B & D Plastics, 302 N.L.R.B. 245, 245 (1991).
14. E.g., NLRB v. Dickinson Press, Inc., 153 F.3d 282,286-87 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding
that a union's distribution of inexpensive T-shirts to employee voters shortly before a
representation election did not impermissibly taint the vote); NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. Consol., 132 F.3d 1001, 1006 (4th Cir. 1997) (ruling that a union's pre-election
distribution of low-priced T-shirts did not unduly influence results); NLRB v. Wintz
Distrib. Co., No. 95-6033, 1996 WL 694150, at *6 (6th Cir. Dec. 3, 1996) (approving the
Board's policy of permitting distribution of low-cost campaign propaganda and affirming
the Board's ruling that distribution of baseball caps to employees did not taint the
election); Nu Skin Int'l, Inc., 307 N.L.R.B. 223, 223-24 (1992) (permitting union
distribution of T-shirts before representation election); Lott's Elec. Co., 293 N.L.R.B. 297,
304 (1989) (holding that employer's distribution of "vote no" buttons was permitted);
Black Dot, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 929, 929 (1978) (upholding election after employer provided
anti-union buttons).
15. E.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc., 324 N.L.R.B. 147, 147-48 (1997) (setting aside an
election after the employer individually distributed mugs inscribed with employees' names
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recognize that the employer controls the workplace regardless of the
election results and can penalize employees believed to be union
supporters. On the other hand, the Board and the courts do not
generally set aside elections based on the manner in which unions
distribute propaganda, reasoning that a union cannot exert power
over employees if it loses an election.
16
Similarly, because of the power disparity between employers and
unions, labor organizations may make pre-election promises to
employees, provided they do not confer a tangible material benefit
before the vote,17 while employers are forbidden from making
promises during the critical period. 8 The rationale for this treatment
is similar to that governing the distribution of propaganda:
employees understand that the realization of union promises depends
on the ability of union negotiators to strike a bargain with the
and "Just Vote No"); Barton Nelson, Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 712, 712 (1995) (invalidating a
vote result after supervisors personally distributed anti-union caps to employees); House
of Raeford Farms, Inc., 308 N.L.R.B. 568, 570 (1992) (voiding an election after the
employer, who offered "Vote No" T-shirts, asked receiving employees to sign a list and
refused to give the shirts to employees wearing pro-union apparel).
16. See Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections
and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. Rnv. 495, 569-77 (1993) (discussing the different
treatment of unions and employers and the rationale behind the practice).
Unions encounter disapproval from the Board and reviewing courts, however, if
they distribute campaign materials within twenty-four hours before the election. NLRB v.
Shrader's, Inc., 928 F.2d 194, 196-98 (6th Cir. 1991) (reversing Board order upholding
election results and remanding for a hearing on the issue of whether a union's distribution
of T-shirts and caps impermissibly influenced voters because the items were distributed on
election day); Owens-Illinois, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 1235, 1235 (1984) (setting aside an
election after the union handed out jackets on election day to employees, some of whom
had not yet voted).
17. NLRB v. Allen's I.G.A. Foodliner, 652 F.2d 594, 596 (6th Cir. 1980) (noting that
unions do not taint representation elections when they promise benefits if elected); Smith
Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 1098, 1101 (1971) (upholding an election after a union promised various
benefits and noting that the promises "are easily recognized by employees to be
dependent on contingencies beyond the [u]nion's control and do not carry with them the
same degree of finality as if uttered by an employer who has it within his power to
implement promises"); Higgins, Inc., 106 N.L.R.B. 845, 846 n.2 (1953) (refusing to set aside
a vote after the union made pre-election promises of increased wages, improved working
conditions, and decreased union dues).
18. For an elaboration of this doctrine, see NLRB v. Golden Age Beverage Co., 415
F.2d 26, 30 (5th Cir. 1969) (noting that "[ajn employer in an unorganized plant, with his
almost absolute control over employment, wages, and working conditions, occupies a
totally different position in a representation contest than a union, which is merely an
outsider seeking entrance to the plant"). For examples of cases in which employer
promises resulted in invalidated elections, see NLRB v. Savair Manufacturing Co., 414
U.S. 270, 277-78 (1973); NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964);
HarperCollins San Francisco v. NLRB, 79 F.3d 1324, 1329-31 (2d Cir. 1996); Amboy Care
Center, 322 N.L.R.B. 207, 208 (1996); Great Plains Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 311 N.L.R.B.
509, 513 (1993).
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employer, while employers exert near total control over the promises
they make. 9
In addition to dividing critical-period conduct into permitted and
proscribed activities, the Board and reviewing courts have considered
First Amendment and statutory rights of employees when
determining the validity of pre-election practices.2" Both the Board
19. See Golden Age Beverage, 415 F.2d at 30. The most common examples of union
statements that do not invalidate election results are promises to negotiate wage increases,
which undeniably depend upon a union's ability to strike a bargain with the employer. See
Kendall Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1401, 1402 (1956) (upholding election results after the union
promised increased wages to employees if elected)' Shirlington Supermarket, Inc., 106
N.LR.B. 666, 667 (1953) (upholding an election after the union promised wage increases,
calling them "customary and legally unobjectionable pre-election propaganda"); Blue
Banner Laundry & Cleaners, 100 N.L.R.B. 2,3 (1952) (upholding an election result after the
union distributed leaflets promising wage and insurance benefits and noting that the Board
"will not undertake to censor or police union campaigns, or consider the truth or falsity of
official union utterances"); Trinity Steel Co., 97 N.L.B. 1486, 1487 (1952) (refusing to void
an election after the union promised a wage increase).
Other union promises seem to depend less upon a union's ability to negotiate with
the employer. The Board and courts, however, have upheld elections after unions
promised, for example, to reduce union fees, provide strike benefits, waive initiation fees
to all bargaining unit members, and provide legal services to employees. NLRB v. VSA,
Inc., 24 F.3d 588, 594 (4th Cir. 1994) (distinguishing Savair in upholding an election after
the union promised a waiver of initiation fees to all employees, regardless of employees'
pre-election allegiances); Colquest Energy, Inc. v. NLRB, 965 F.2d 116, 122-23 (6th Cir.
1992) (same); Molded Acoustical Prod., Inc. v. NLRB, 815 F.2d 934, 937-39 (3d Cir. 1987)
(same); Primco Casting Corp., 174 N.L.R.B. 244, 245 (1969) (upholding the validity of an
election after the union promised to refund strike fund money to employees if elected);
FDIC, 38 F.L.R.A. 952, 962-63 (1990) (refusing to set aside an election after the union
promised, if elected, to file a lawsuit against the employer challenging employees'
temporary status); Dart Container, 277 N.L.R.B. 1369, 1369 (1985) (upholding an election
result after a pre-election union flier promised "free legal help from the Teamsters
attorneys," noting that the union merely promised to extend a standard union benefit to
new members).
In contrast, the Board has set aside elections after employers promised wage
increases, benefits, or remedies to employees' complaints during the critical period. Dow
Chem. Co. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 637, 644 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that an employer's
"statements from which promises may reasonably be inferred" are sufficient to show a
violation of the NLRA); Johnson Architectural Metal Co., 294 N.L.R.B. 896, 900 (1989)
(noting that "[t]he promise of benefits by an employer during an election campaign may
constitute a subtle but nevertheless unlawful inducement if its purpose is to impinge of the
employees freedom of choice in selecting union representation"); Am. Freightways, Inc.,
327 N.L.R.B. No. 154,1999-2000 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 15,092 (Mar. 12, 1999) (noting that
the employer representative told employees that the company "would look into the
problems and ... fix them"); Chef's Pantry, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. 77, 83 (1980) (setting aside
an election after the employer "impliedly promised" benefits to employees to encourage
anti-union support).
20. E.g., Bill Johnson's Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983) (noting that
courts "should be sensitive to these First Amendment values in construing the NLRA");
Cent. Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 543 (1972) (approving the Board's
recognition of the right of unions to communicate freely with employees).
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and the courts have recognized not only the rights of employees to
organize under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 1 but also
the rights of non-unionized employees to hear the messages of labor
organizations z The Supreme Court has similarly acknowledged the
need for unions to communicate freely with workers in protecting
unions' and employees' First Amendment rights of speech, assembly,
and access to courts,13 as well as the First Amendment rights of labor
and other organizations to provide free legal assistance to vindicate
the legal rights of both members and non-members. 4 The Court has
21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994). In Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, the Court recognized that
the NLRA allows concerted activity among employees who do not all work for the same
employer (that is, unions of employees) and "protects employees from retaliation by their
employers when they seek to improve working conditions through resort to administrative
and judicial forums." 437 U.S. 556, 556 (1978). The Fourth Circuit had acknowledged
earlier that "[t]he giving of aid by a labor union to an employee in prosecution of a claim
for back wages is clearly a concerted activity on the part of employees protected by the
[NLRA]." NLRB v. Moss Planing Mill Co., 206 F.2d 557, 559 (4th Cir. 1953). The Board
had recognized the right more than a decade earlier. M.F.A. Milling Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 614,
624-26 (1940) (noting that the NLRA protected as concerted activity the filing of four
suits by nonunionized employees, with union assistance, against the employer).
22. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956) (stating that employees'
rights to self-organization depend in part "on the ability of employees to learn the
advantages of self-organization from others"); Cent. Hardware, 407 U.S. at 542 (noting
that unorganized employees' "organization rights are not viable in a vacuum" and holding
that the NLRA, which grants employees the right to "'self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations,'" includes the right of union organizers to discuss labor
organizing with employees (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970))).
23. In Thomas v. Collins, the Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he right ... to
discuss, and inform people concerning, the advantages and disadvantages of unions and
joining them is protected not only as part of free speech, but as part of free assembly." 323
U.S. 516, 532 (1945). The Court further stated that union organizers have a First
Amendment right to "persuade [workers] to action, not merely to describe facts." Id. at
537. The Court in United Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michigan reaffirmed that
"collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental
right within the protection of the First Amendment." 401 U.S. 576,585 (1971).
24. The Supreme Court has established these organizational rights both within and
outside the employment context. For labor-related cases, see United Mine Workers v.
Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1967) (ruling that the First Amendment
rights to assemble and petition permitted the union to pay attorneys to assist members in
vindicating their legal rights); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel.
Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 5-6, 8 (1964) (noting that First Amendment protections of
assembly, petition, and free speech give employees the right to advise each other in
asserting statutory labor rights, and holding that the union may recommend attorneys to
advocate for employee claims). For cases not involving labor issues, see In re Primus, 436
U.S. 412,432,439 (1978) (holding that South Carolina's imposition of public censure on an
attorney affiliated with the ACLU for offering free legal assistance to a woman who had
been involuntarily sterilized violated the attorney's and the ACLU's First Amendment
freedoms of association and political expression); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 419,
428-29 (1963) (striking down a Virginia statute that prevented the NAACP from
exercising First Amendment rights of expression and association by assisting persons who
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not specifically addressed, however, whether such legal aid
impermissibly influences a union representation election.'
Although the Supreme Court has not heard a case on the issue,
the Board and two federal circuit courts of appeals have addressed
union financing of legal services for non-unionized employees during
the critical period. The question at issue in these cases was whether
the financing of such services impermissibly influenced the
employees' free choice in a subsequent election. Each time, the
Board upheld the representation election after the union had funded
26 Tvcnrlegal services. In contrast, the Sixth and District of Columbia
Circuits declined to enforce representation elections occurring shortly
after the filing of union-financed lawsuits against employers. 7
Without the Supreme Court's attention to this issue, the conflict
between the Board and the two circuit courts will persist,2 and unions
and employers will continue to face uncertainty surrounding the
validity of the practice.2 9
Union economic support of employment-related suits against
employers during a campaign gives the union an opportunity to
demonstrate to employees that the union would effectively represent
sought vindication of constitutional and other rights).
25. The Supreme Court and lower courts have upheld, in the limited context of the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act (FMSHA), 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-926 (1986 & West
Supp. 2000), union provision of work-related legal help to non-unionized workers that the
union was attempting to organize. Individuals affiliated with the United Mine Workers'
union regularly act as designated non-employee safety representatives for non-unionized
mine workers, even when the union is campaigning for a representation election at those
mines. See Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 217 (1994) (upholding, under
the FMSHA, the right of nonunionized mine workers to choose a person to represent
them in safety issues); Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 56 F.3d 1275, 1280 (10th Cir. 1995) (ruling that the FMSHA allows a union agent
to represent non-unionized miners in vindicating safety rights); Kerr-McGee Coal Corp. v.
Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 40 F.3d 1257, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding
that the FMSHA allows a non-elected union to represent miners on safety issues at a non-
unionized mine); Utah Power & Light Co. v. Sec'y of Labor, 897 F.2d 447, 452 (10th Cir.
1990) (ruling that the FMSHA allows miners to authorize non-employees to represent
them on work safety issues).
26. See infra notes 30-42,50-116 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 43-49, 117-26 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
29. In recent years, unions have filed suits during campaigns in increasing numbers.
For example, in addition to the four cases heard by the Board, the American Federation
of State, County, and Municipal Employees has pursued litigation under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) on behalf of employees whom it has attempted to organize, see
Novotel N.Y., 321 N.L.R.B. 624, 629 (1996), and the United Food and Commercial
Workers funded a class action lawsuit on behalf of employees during an organizing
campaign, alleging wage payment violations of the FLSA. See Shaffer v. Farm Fresh, Inc.,
966 F.2d 142, 144 (4th Cir. 1992).
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workers. Employers who wish to keep unions out of their workplaces
naturally prefer that the Board and reviewing courts deny labor
organizations the opportunity to show their effectiveness before a
representation election. The permissibility of union-supported suits
during the critical period is thus particularly important to both unions
and employers. A review of the decisions of the Board and reviewing
courts makes clear the arguments advanced for and against allowing
the practice.
In Nestle Dairy Systems, Inc., the Board ordered the employer
to bargain with a newly elected Teamsters union local after holding
that a class action lawsuit, filed by the union three days before an
election on behalf of employees and against the employer, did not
taint the vote.3' The union and three employees brought a union-
financed suit against the employer and three former officers of the
union local under the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO). 2 The lawsuit alleged that the defendants
had negotiated a collective bargaining agreement when the union
local had not established the support of a majority of employees in
the bargaining unit.33  In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that the
agreement stipulated lower wages than employees would have earned
had the defendants bargained in good faith.' The Teamsters
convened a meeting of interested employees the night before the
30. 311 N.L.R.B. 987 (1993), rev'd and enforcement denied sub nom. Nestle Ice Cream
Co. v. NLRB, 46 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 1995). Nestle Dairy was decided by a three-member
panel of the Board. Members Devaney and Oviatt maintained the majority position, see
id. at 987, while Chairman Stephens dissented in part, see id. at 989 (Stephens, Chairman,
dissenting in part).
31. Id. at 987. In dissent, Chairman Stephens posited that he would have invalidated
the election result because he believed that the lawsuit unduly influenced the workers'
choice. Id. at 989 (Stephens, Chairman, dissenting in part). To arrive at this conclusion,
he applied a balancing test that Member Cohen later applied in his dissenting opinion in
Novotel N.Y., 321 N.L.R.B. 624, 643 (1996) (Cohen, Member, dissenting in part). Nestle
Dairy, 311 N.L.R.B. at 989-90 (Stephens, Chairman, dissenting in part).
32. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
33. If proven, this alleged action would have constituted a violation of the NLRA.
See Bernhard-Altmann Tex. Corp., 122 N.L.R.B. 1289, 1290-93 (1959) (finding that the
employer's acknowledgment of the union as the exclusive bargaining representative, when
in fact the union did not enjoy majority support from employees, violated 29 U.S.C.
§§ 158(a)(2) and 158(b)(1)(A) (1994)), affd sub nom. Int'l Ladies Garment Workers'
Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
34. Nestle Dairy, 311 N.L.R.B. at 987. The trial court dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a claim but allowed the union to submit an amended complaint. Nestle Ice
Cream Co. v. NLRB, 46 F.3d 578, 580 (6th Cir. 1995). The employer moved for dismissal
and sanctions, and the union agreed to a dismissal with prejudice, in return for the
employer's withdrawal of its sanctions motion. Id.
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representation election.35 At that meeting, then-Teamsters President
Ron Carey and other union officials and attorneys announced the
filing of the lawsuit and stated that each employee could win as much
as $35,000 in lost wages and punitive damages based on calculations
that the employer had underpaid workers five dollars per hour. 6 The
officials requested the employees' votes the following day, and the
workers elected the union as their bargaining representative.3 7
Assuming that the union's costs in filing the suit were minimal,
the Board held that the employer had not met its burden of proving
that the union provided employees with a "substantial and direct
benefit. '38 The Board further reasoned that, because of the uncertain
outcome of the litigation, the union had conferred no tangible benefit
upon employees; the possible $35,000 per employee was analogous to
a union's permissible promises to workers to increase wages or
benefits.3 9 The Board analogized the RICO suit to a complaint under
the Occupational Safety and Health Act,'° a state labor law claim, or a
charge of unfair labor practices prior to a representation election,
none of which the Board would consider a benefit to employees.4'
Finally, the Board maintained that, even if the lawsuit conferred a
benefit to employees, unions have a First Amendment right to seek
redress to vindicate workers' rights.4'
The Sixth Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order.43 In
contrast to the Board's analogy of the union-financed lawsuit to
legitimate claims linked to employees' work conditions, the court in
Nestle Ice Cream Co. v. NLRB viewed the RICO suit as an
impermissible conferral of benefits that improperly influenced
employees in the election." After concluding that the lawsuit
constituted a conferral of a pre-election benefit, the court then
posited a two-prong test to determine the permissibility of a benefit in
light of an ensuing election. First, the court asked whether the lawsuit
35. Nestle Dairy, 311 N.L.R.B. at 987. About 100 of the 334 employees in the unit
attended this meeting. Id
36. Id.
37. Id,
38. Id. at 987-88.
39. Id. at 988; see also supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text (discussing union pre-
election promises).
40. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-678 (1999 & West Supp. 2000).
41. Nestle Dairy, 311 N.L.R.B. at 988.
42. See id.; see also supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text (discussing employees'
and unions' rights under the First Amendment and the NLRA).
43. See Nestle Ice Cream Co. v. NLRB, 46 F.3d 578, 586 (6th Cir. 1995), rev'g and
denying enforcement to Nestle Dairy Systems, Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 987 (1993).
44. See Nestle Ice Cream, 46 F.3d at 582-84.
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was "sufficiently valuable and desirable" to employees to influence
their vote.45 Answering in the affirmative, the court then asked
whether the influence rose to a level where it served to "purchase" or
"unduly influence" employee votes in a manner "without relation to
the merits of the election. '46 The court determined that the lawsuit
"smacked of a 'purchase' of votes" because the Teamsters owed the
employees no duty to provide legal services. 47 The court further
concluded that the suit risked engendering in employees a sense of
obligation to vote for the union based on a desire to continue the
legal claim.48 Finally, the court rejected the union's claim of a First
Amendment right to seek redress of grievances, reasoning that the
Teamsters could not be class representatives of employees who were
not members of the union.
49
One year later, in Novotel New York,5 0 the Board upheld a
representation election after a private law firm filed a union-financed
lawsuit eight days before the vote5 The suit involved forty-eight
employees who claimed that the employer failed to pay overtime
45. Nestle Ice Cream, 46 F.3d at 583 (quoting NLRB v. Shrader's, Inc., 928 F.2d 194,
198 (6th Cir. 1991)).
46. Id (quoting Shrader's, 928 F.2d at 198).
47. Id at 584.
48. See id. at 584-85.
49. See id. at 585-86. The court noted that, because the employees, not the union,
were injured by the alleged indiscretions of the employer and previous union leaders, the
Teamsters had no grievance of its own for which to seek redress. See id. at 586.
50. 321 N.L.R.B. 624 (1996). Novotel was decided by a three-member panel of the
Board. Chairman Gould and Member Browning maintained the majority position, see id.
at 624, while Member Cohen dissented in part, see i. at 641 (Cohen, Member, dissenting
in part).
51. Id. at 625-26. After upholding the election results, the Board certified the union
as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees qualified in the bargaining
unit. Id. at 641. In order to contest the Board's election ruling, Novotel subsequently
refused to bargain, which prompted the union to file a charge with the Board alleging that
the employer had violated its duty to bargain under the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)
(1994). See Novotel N.Y., 322 N.L.R.B. No. 121, 1996 WL 730801, at *1 (Dec. 16, 1996).
The General Counsel of the Board issued a complaint based on the charge and sought
summary judgment, which the Board granted. See id. Novotel appealed the Board's order
to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which heard oral
arguments on October 3, 1997. Joint Motion of the Parties for Dismissal of Causes at 1-2,
52nd St. Hotel Assoc. v. NLRB, No. 96-1488, 1997 WL 811778 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per
curiam). On October 28, 1997, the parties jointly moved for dismissal of the appeal, which
the court granted. See 52nd Street Hotel Assoc., 1997 WL 811778, at *1; Joint Motion of
the Parties for Dismissal of Causes at 1-2; see also infra note 154 (discussing factors that
might persuade an employer not to contest election results). On September 4, 1998,
Novotel recognized the union as the exclusive representative of bargaining unit
employees, and on September 25, 1998, both parties agreed to an employment contract,
which is still in effect. Telephone Interview with Jim Donovan, Director of Organizing,
New York Hotel and Motel Trades Council, AFL-CIO (Oct. 12,2000).
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wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).52 The
attorney did not file the employees' consent forms with the court until
a few weeks after filing the suit, however, because the employees
feared that the employer would identify them as plaintiffs5 At some
time after the complaint was filed, but before the vote, the union
distributed three fliers that it maintained were unrelated to the FLSA
lawsuit.5 4 One flier publicized a purported failure by Novotel to
honor a promise of premium pay to employees, another announced
the union's success in obtaining pay owed to unionized employees at
another hotel, and a third invited employees to meet with unionized
workers.5 5 Employees at Novotel voted in favor of the union. 6 The
law firm that handled the lawsuit billed the union for approximately
$11,000 in legal fees 7
In contrast to its finding in Nestle Dairy, the Board in Novotel
determined that the union had conferred a pre-election benefit on the
unorganized employees5 The Board held, however, that the union-
supported lawsuit was sheltered by the Constitution and the NLRA.59
The Board stated that the Supreme Court's case law "strongly
suggest[ed]" that the First Amendment protected the union's
participation in the lawsuit, even though the union did not officially
represent the employee plaintiffs at the time of filing.' The Board
analogized the lawsuit to the Court's holding in NAACP v. Button,
61
which extended First Amendment protection to the NAACP's
litigation on behalf of people who were not members of that group.62
The Board then linked the Button holding to cases in which the Court
held that unions have a constitutional right to speak with unorganized
52. Novotel, 321 N.L.R.B. at 624-25; 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219 (1998 & West Supp.
2000).
53. Novotel, 321 N.L.R.B. at 626.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 626 & n.10.
56. Id at 624. Election results showed seventy votes for the union and fifty-six
against, with the validity of ten ballots in question. Id. The Board did not rule on the
challenged ballots because they were insufficient to change the outcome. Id.
57. Id. at 626. The Board stated that a law firm billed the union for $10,653 in legal
fees and $437.80 in disbursements for the lawsuit. I& The bill covered services rendered
during a six-month period that began two months before the election. Id.
58. I- at 636.
59. See hi at 633-34.
60. See id. at 631; see also supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text (discussing
employees' and unions' rights under the First Amendment and the NLRA).
61. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
62. See id. at 420, 443. In subsequent cases, the Court reiterated that Button protected
"solicitation of prospective litigants, many of whom were not members of the NAACP."
E.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412,423-24 (1978) (footnote omitted).
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employees about work-related issues.6' In the Board's view, at the
intersection of these cases lies the right of unions to finance legal aid
for non-members during an election campaign.64 In addition to
establishing the union's First Amendment right to assist in the suit,
the Board noted that employees' rights to organize under the NLRA
extend to union officials who attempt to persuade those employees to
join the union.65 According to the Board, legal precedent established
that, by assisting employees in their work-related lawsuit, the union
"did precisely what the [NLRA] intended labor organizations to do:
it aided employees engaged in concerted activity." 66
After establishing the validity of the union-supported suit under
the First Amendment and the NLRA, the Board distinguished the
union's legal assistance from impermissible grants of benefits during
the critical period before an election. 67 In contrast to a conferral of
goods or services wholly unrelated to employees' labor concerns, 68 the
union's financial support for employees' FLSA claims in Novotel was
linked directly to a vindication of workers' rights under the NLRA.69
The issue of wages had been central to the employees'
communications with the union since the organizing campaign
began.70 Labor union funding of legal services over matters against
employers that directly relates to terms and conditions of
employment "cannot be characterized as a pecuniary inducement
extraneous to efforts to vindicate employment-related concerns. "71
The Board then addressed the Sixth Circuit's decision in Nestle
Ice Cream.72  Although the Board disagreed with the court's
conclusion in Nestle that the union's lawsuit had conferred an
63. See Novotel, 321 N.L.R.B. at 631-32; see also supra notes 24-25 and accompanying
text (discussing unions' rights to provide legal aid to employees).
64. See Novotel, 321 N.L.R.B. at 631-32.
65. The Board stated that "labor union organizers possess [NLRA] rights derivative
from employees they are seeking to organize, but do not currently represent." Id. at 633
(citing Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 533 (1992)); see also supra notes 20-25 and
accompanying text (discussing employees' and unions' rights under the First Amendment
and the NLRA).
66. Novotel, 321 N.L.R.B. at 633.
67. See id. at 636.
68. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing impermissible union
benefits).
69. See Novotel, 321 N.L.R.B. at 635; see also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
70. Novotel, 321 N.L.R.B. at 635.
71. Id.
72. 46 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 1995), rev'g and denying enforcement to Nestle Dairy Sys.,
Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 987 (1993); see also supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text
(discussing Nestle Ice Cream).
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impermissible pre-election benefit,73 the Board concluded that
Novotel and future cases with similar facts would pass Nestle's two-
part test.74 While a union-financed lawsuit related to the employer's
work conditions could influence an employee's vote, thus satisfying
the first prong of the test, the benefit would fail the second prong
because the suit directly pertained to the "merits of the election." 75
The Board reasoned that the suit "demonstrates the kind and quality
of services the [u]nion might be expected to provide if it is elected
bargaining representative and thus bears directly on the question
facing every employee in the voting booth.
76
According to the Board, the Sixth Circuit's two reasons under
the second prong in Nestle for determining that the union-financed
lawsuit was impermissible did not apply in Novotel.77 First, although
the union in Novotel had no legal duty to support the employees'
lawsuit, the labor organization had a right to do so under the First
Amendment and the NLRA.7 8 The suit, therefore, "was not an
impermissible attempt to purchase votes, but rather a protected effort
to improve employee terms and conditions of employment.
79
Second, the parties presented no evidence that the labor organization
would end its support of the suit if employees did not elect the union;
in fact, the evidence showed that union funding would continue
regardless of the vote result.80
The Board also addressed the Sixth Circuit's concerns related to
associational standing.' The Board distinguished the question of
standing in the two cases, noting that in Nestle the union was a party
to the lawsuit it supported while the union in Novotel was not.82 The
Board held that, although the Novotel union was not seeking
standing, it nevertheless had a First Amendment interest in aiding
73. See Novotel, 321 N.L.R.B. at 636.
74. Id.; see also supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (discussing the test: first,
whether the benefit could influence employees' votes, and second, whether the benefit was
related to the merits of the election).
75. Novotel, 321 N.L.R.B. at 636 (quoting Nestle Ice Cream, 46 F.3d at 583).
76. Id. at 637.
77. See id.; see also supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
78. See Novotel, 321 N.L.R.B. at 637; see'also supra notes 20-25 and accompanying
text (discussing employees' and unions' rights under the First Amendment and the
NLRA).
79. Novotel, 321 N.L.R.B. at 637.
80. Id.
81. See Nestle Ice Cream, 46 F.3d at 585-86; see also supra note 49 and accompanying
text (discussing associational standing in Nestle Ice Cream).
82. See Nestle Ice Cream, 46 F.3d at 637 n.61.
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Novotel employees in exercising their rights under the NLRA.83 The
Board also determined that the union presented legitimate
explanations for the filing of the suit eight days before the
representation election: the law firm had completed its research on
the plaintiffs' wage claims and had received a sufficient number of
consent forms from employees wishing to participate. 4 Moreover,
union officials stated that they wanted the law firm to file the suit
before the vote to avoid the appearance that the suit was conditioned
on the election result.
85
Finally, the Board rejected the adoption of a bright-line rule that
would ban lawsuit filings during the critical period. 6 The Board
reasoned that if a union-supported suit were filed prior to requesting
a representation election, then any activities related to the suit that
occur during the critical period could be challenged as
impermissible. 7 Waiting to file a suit until after a valid election
would raise the possibility of an impermissible grant of benefits
during the critical period in the form of preparations for filing, such as
investigating and discussing the suit with employees. 8 Moreover,
waiting to file a suit until the Board has declared an election to be
valid might extinguish employees' claims altogether under the
relevant statutes of limitations.89  Because unsatisfied parties
automatically extend the critical period by contesting the validity of a
representation vote, an absolute ban on filings during the critical
period would encourage employers to protract litigation surrounding
elections, thus prohibiting lawsuits under the FLSA.90 Proscribing all
lawsuit filings during the critical period could thus force employees to
choose between their NLRA right to seek representation by a union
and their NLRA right to request legal assistance from that union.91
Dissenting in Novotel, Member Cohen would have set aside the
vote and ordered a new election on the grounds that the union's
assistance in the employees' lawsuit during the critical period tainted
83. Idt; see also supra notes 22-24, 59-66 and accompanying text (discussing
employees' and unions' rights under the First Amendment and the NLRA).
84. Novotel, 321 N.L.R.B. at 637.
85. Id at 626 n.11.
86. Id at 638-39. For a discussion of the critical period, see supra note 4 and infra
notes 149-54.
87. Novotel, 321 N.L.R.B. at 638.
88. Id. at 639.
89. ld.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (1994) (stating that the statute of limitations under
the FLSA is two years from accrual of the cause of action, unless the violation was willful,
in which case the statute of limitations is three years).
90. Novotel, 321 N.L.R.B. at 639.
91. Id
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the workers' free choice in balloting 2 To reach this conclusion,
Member Cohen followed what he asserted was the Board's customary
approach in cases involving pre-election benefits: a four-part test to
determine whether a grant of benefits during an election
impermissibly influences the election outcome.93 The test examines
(1) the size of the grant as compared to the stated purpose in
providing it, (2) the number of employees receiving the benefit, (3)
the reasonable employee's view of the purpose of the grant, and (4)
the timing of the benefit.94
Applying the test, Member Cohen first calculated the union's
expenditure in legal fees to equal $163 per plaintiff,95 an amount
which he stated was far greater than the value of pre-election union
benefits that the Board had found impermissible.96 Moreover,
Member Cohen maintained that the grant was large considering the
stated purpose of helping workers exercise their FLSA rights. He
asserted that the union could have either advised the employees to
file a complaint with state labor authorities or simply filed the lawsuit
after the election.9 Second, Member Cohen maintained that the
number of benefit recipients was substantial: forty-three employee-
plaintiffs received free legal services out of a total of 136 workers who
cast ballots, with a victory margin of fourteen and ten contested
ballots.98 Third, the grant of legal aid would instill in workers a sense
of obligation to vote for the union.99 Fourth, the union timed the
filing in order to influence the vote and not to allay statute-of-
limitations concerns, according to Member Cohen.1°° Although the
law firm filed the suit before the vote, the statute of limitations was
92. Id. at 648 (Cohen, Member, dissenting in part).
93. Id at 643 (Cohen, Member, dissenting in part) (citing B & D Plastics, 302
N.L.R.B. 245,245 (1991)).
94. Id (Cohen, Member, dissenting in part) (citing B & D Plastics, 302 N.L.R.B. 245,
245 (1991)).
95. Id. (Cohen, Member, dissenting in part). Member Cohen stated that the union
spent "over $8,000" but did not explain how he arrived at that figure. See id (Cohen,
Member, dissenting in part). The Board's opinion stated that a law firm had billed the
union for fees and expenses totaling $11,090.80. See id. at 626; see also supra note 57 and
accompanying text (describing the union's costs).
96. Novotel, 321 N.L.R.B. at 643 (Cohen, Member, dissenting in part); see also supra
note 13 and accompanying text (discussing union benefits that tainted elections).
97. Novotel, 321 N.L.R.B. at 643 (Cohen, Member, dissenting in part). In its opinion,
the Board raised concerns related to the option of filing after an election. Id at 638-39.
For a discussion of this option, see infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
98. Novotel, 321 N.L.R.B. at 643 (Cohen, Member, dissenting in part); see also supra
note 56 (listing election results).
99. Novotel, 321 N.L.R.B. at 644 (Cohen, Member, dissenting in part).
100. Id at 645-46 (Cohen, Member, dissenting in part).
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not tolled until the firm submitted the plaintiffs' consent forms after
the election.1 1
Member Cohen also criticized the Board's rationale for
concluding that the First Amendment and the NLRA protected the
pre-election filing.'01 According to Member Cohen, the NLRA
neither gave employees a right to receive free legal aid nor granted
unions a right to provide it, especially considering that the union did
not represent the employees. 0 3 Member Cohen also criticized what
he called the Board's "leaps of logic" in its First Amendment
analysis °4 Although he agreed that unions may confer with non-
member employees and that unions may hire attorneys to represent
its own members, Member Cohen asserted that it does not follow that
unions have a First Amendment right to pay legal costs of non-
members before an election.
05
One year after Novotel, the Board reaffirmed its position on
union-financed suits filed during the critical period in two brief
opinions. In BHY Concrete Finishing, Inc.,"° a union financed a
lawsuit against the employer on behalf of employees who made
claims under the FLSA. °7 The employer, citing the Sixth Circuit's
Nestle Ice Cream decision,108 argued that the election results should be
set aside, but the Board affirmed the hearing officer's conclusion,
distinguishing BHY from Nestle, and found the lawsuit permissible.0 9
Member Higgins dissented, relying on Nestle and on the dissent in
Novotel to argue that the suit compromised the employees' free
choice in the vote."0
In its most recent ruling on union financing of pre-election suits,
Freund Baking Co.," the Board found that an employer violated the
NLRA by refusing to bargain with a union that had won a
101. See id. (Cohen, Member, dissenting in part).
102. Id at 646-47 (Cohen, Member, dissenting in part); see also supra notes 58-66 and
accompanying text (discussing the Board's reasoning).
103. Novotel, 321 N.L.R.B. at 646 (Cohen, Member, dissenting in part).
104. See id. (Cohen, Member, dissenting in part).
105. 1a at 646-47 (Cohen, Member, dissenting in part).
106. 323 N.L.R.B. 505 (1997).
107. Id
108. 46 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 1995); see also supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text
(discussing the Nestle Ice Cream decision).
109. BHY, 323 N.L.R.B. at 505. The hearing officer also determined that the lawsuit
was permitted under the B & D Plastics four-factor test that the dissent urged in Novotel.
Id.; see also supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text (discussing the test).
110. BHY, 323 N.L.R.B. at 506 & n.1 (Higgins, Member, dissenting).
111. 324 N.L.R.B. No. 175, 1997 WL 715828, at *1-2 (Nov. 7, 1997). A three-member
panel of the Board issued the decision. Id at *1.
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representation election."' Referring to his dissent in BHY, Member
Higgins noted that he had dissented in the representation proceeding
in Freund on the grounds that the union improperly influenced the
vote through filing and publicizing a class action lawsuit during the
critical period." One week before the election, four workers brought
a class-action lawsuit on behalf of all eligible employees alleging that
the employer violated California labor laws by failing to pay overtime
wages." 4 The day before the election, the union distributed fliers
informing employees of the lawsuit and requesting their votes."
5
Employees voted in favor of the union."
6
The company appealed the Freund ruling to the District of
Columbia Circuit, which denied enforcement of the Board's order."
7
The Board relied largely on arguments developed in its Novotel
opinion, but the court found those arguments unconvincing." 8 The
court first rejected the Board's argument that a union-supported
lawsuit is distinguishable from impermissible benefits, such as free
medical screenings or life insurance for employees." 9 Although the
court agreed that a union's demonstration of its ability to litigate
successfully on behalf of employees is a relevant election issue, the
court emphasized that the filing of a suit "which may be meritless [or]
even frivolous" does not prove the union's ability to represent
workers. 20
112. The Board concluded that the employer violated 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(a)(5)
(1994). Id at *1. The Board stated that the employer "is in fact refusing to bargain with
the [u]nion in order to test the certification." Id
The election involved workers at the company's plant in Hayward, California. Id.
at *2. The NLRB had certified the Bakery, Confectionery and Tobacco Workers
International Union, Local 119, as the exclusive bargaining representative of the
employees. IL
113. Id. at *2 n.1.
114. Freund Baking Co. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 928, 930 (D.C. Cir. 1999), denying
enforcement of Freund Baking Co., 1997 WL 715828.
The workers were represented by the private attorney who had represented the
plaintiffs in Nestle. Id; see also Nestle Ice Cream Co. v. NLRB, 46 F.3d 578, 580 (6th Cir.
1995) (referring to the lawyer, David Rosenfeld, as an attorney representing the
Teamsters). In its opinion, the District of Columbia Circuit stated that Mr. Rosenfeld
"has several times before represented employees filing lawsuits against their employers
just before a representation election." Freund, 165 F.3d at 930.
115. Freund, 165 F.3d at 930.
116. Id at 930-31.
117. Id. at 930.
118. Id. at 933-35; see also supra notes 50-91 and accompanying text (discussing the
Board's Novotel ruling).
119. Freund, 165 F.3d at 933; see also supra note 13 and accompanying text (describing
union benefits that invalidated election results).
120. Freund, 165 F.3d at 933.
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Next, the court found unconvincing the argument that the lawsuit
was a protected activity that improved workers' employment
conditions under the NLRA. In reaching this conclusion, the court
countered that, although a union may permissibly file pre-election
charges with the Board alleging that an employer is impermissibly
influencing the election, the union may not support a lawsuit that is
unrelated to an alleged election infraction.'2' According to the court,
a union's suit must be the cure and not the cause of an unfair election
influence. 2 Moreover, the court reasoned that, during the critical
period, certain employee rights under the NLRA may be suspended
out of deference to a greater countervailing interest in conducting an
untainted representation election.'
Finally, the court disposed of the Board's contention that a
union-financed suit is protected by the First Amendment, applying
the same reasoning as in the NLRA argument that "the parties to a
representation election do not retain their full panoply of rights
during the critical period.' ' 2 4 The court noted as an example that,
although an employer has a First Amendment right to make
controversial statements on racial issues, expressing those views
before an election runs the risk of unfairly influencing the vote, which
could lead to setting the election aside.'25 The court concluded that
the Board's rule allowing for union support of lawsuits during the
critical period "is not based upon any reasonably defensible
interpretation of the [NLRA].' 2 6
121. Id. at 933-34.
122. Id. at 934.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 935.
125. Id
126. Itt The Board did not seek certiorari to the Supreme Court. Freund Baking Co.,
330 N.L.R.B., No. 13, 1999-2000 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 15,335 (Nov. 16, 1999). The Board
reopened the case, invalidated the election, revoked the certification of the union as
exclusive bargaining representative, and ordered a second election. Id. The Board
rejected the employer's assertion that its employees must renew their vote petition before
the NLRB may order a second election. Id. at *2; see also Provincial House, Inc., 236
N.L.R.B. 926, 926 (1978) (explaining that Board policy does not require a renewed
showing of interest in an election when a previous vote has been set aside due to a valid
objection); Interlake Steamship Co., 178 N.L.R.B. 128, 129 (1969) (same).
In response to the Board's decision to order a second election, the employer
petitioned the District of Columbia Circuit for a writ of mandamus and a stay of the
Board's order pending review. The court denied both motions, noting that the employer
did not satisfy the requirements of either remedy. In re Freund Baking Co., No. 00-1008,
2000 WL 274217, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 6,2000) (per curiam).
In a second election conducted on March 9, 2000, a majority of employees voted
against union representation. After the union challenged the validity of the election, the
Board determined that the employer unlawfully tainted the vote and ordered a third
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The District of Columbia Circuit's opinion in Freund failed to
address a number of arguments that the Board had presented in
NovoteP27 and in its brief before the Freund court.12s First, the court
did not refute the Board's assertion that union support of workers'
statutory claims is different from a union benefit that is arguably
related to wages or working conditions.129 The court's treatment
merely linked the union-financed lawsuit to union grants of medical
and insurance benefits and stated that "[t]he Board's attempt to
distinguish free legal services therefore fails" without explaining why
it fails. 30 Yet a critical difference between the two union activities
appears to exist. Union provision of medical or insurance benefits is
akin to a cash benefit that flows directly from the union to the
employees, without the employer's involvement. On the other hand,
a union-supported suit against the employer over wages or working
conditions is an attempt to force the employer to give employees
what the law requires. Any improvement in the work situation will
flow from the employer to the workers, not from the union to the
workers.
The District of Columbia Circuit also ignored the possible
extinction of employees' statutory claims against the employer
through the running of the statute of limitations."' As the Board had
explained in Novotel, a prohibition of union-financed suits against
employers during the critical period will, in some cases, deny
employees the right to sue for alleged workplace violations.32
Moreover, litigation surrounding representation elections can drag on
for months or even years, extending the critical period and increasing
the likelihood that employees will have to decide between exercising
their right to decide whether to unionize and exercising their right to
seek union assistance in their legal claim. 33
Finally, the court did not explore the extent to which employees'
and unions' First Amendment and statutory rights may be suspended
election, which is scheduled for early 2001. Telephone Interview with Michael Fouch,
Secretary-Treasurer, Bakery, Confectionery, Tobacco Workers and Grain Millers
International Union (BCTGM), Local 119 (Nov. 1, 2000).
127. See Novotel N.Y., 321 N.L.R.B. 624,629-39 (1996).
128. Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 27-47, Freund Baking Co. v.
NLRB, 165 F.3d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (No. 97-1694).
129. Freund, 165 F.3d at 933.
130. Id.
131. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text (discussing the Board's reasoning in
Novotel regarding statute of limitations concerns).
132. Novotel, 321 N.L.R.B. at 639.
133. Id.
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during the critical period.134 The District of Columbia Circuit's
analogy of a union-supported pre-election suit to an employer's pre-
vote expression of racial hate speech fails to address the possibility
that a union might have a more compelling argument for aiding
workers who are attempting to collect overtime wages denied them
than an employer has for making racially inflammatory pre-election
statements. Similarly, the court's skepticism of the validity of some
union-supported claims did not include justify applying a blanket ban
on filing suits during the critical period. 6
Unless the Supreme Court grants certiorari in a future case, the
District of Columbia Circuit's rebuff of the NLRB's rule allowing
unions to finance worker's suits during the critical period1 37 effectively
ends judicial examination of the issue. In subsequent controversies
with similar facts, the Board will likely uphold the results of
representation elections, as it did in the two post-Novotel cases . 3  A
Board decision in favor of the practice precludes the prevailing party
from appealing the ruling and "allows only the employer the
opportunity" to choose a federal appeals court for review.3 9 Because
the District of Columbia Circuit in Freund refused to enforce the
Board's ruling that the representation election was valid, in similar
cases employers will naturally appeal Board decisions to the District
of Columbia Circuit, regardless of the locations of either the
company's businesses or the challenged union activity.140  This
scenario makes it unlikely that appeals courts other than the District
of Columbia and Sixth Circuits will hear cases on this issue and
therefore rests a question of national scope upon only two appeals
courts. Moreover, because this procedural pattern allows little
134. Freund, 165 F.3d at 935.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 933-34. A judicial alternative to prohibiting outright the filing of all suits
during the critical period is examining the merits of the claim. The Supreme Court has
held that the Board may not enjoin a state court suit unless it "lacks a reasonable basis in
fact or law." Bill Johnson's Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 748 (1983). Although the
employer in Freund was not seeking an injunction of the lawsuit, the court could instead
set aside the election if the suit failed the reasonable basis test.
137. For a discussion of the Board's decision to support the rule, see supra notes 50-91
and accompanying text.
138. For a discussion of these cases, which relied on the Board's reasoning in Novotel
N. Y, 321 N.L.R.B. 624 (1996), see supra notes 106-16 and accompanying text.
139. The NLRA allows only parties "aggrieved by a final order of the Board" to
appeal. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1994).
140. The party appealing a Board decision may choose among various courts of
appeals: the circuit in which the case's alleged events occurred, the circuit in which the
party resides or conducts business, or the District of Columbia Circuit. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 160(e)-(f) (1994) (describing the appeals process).
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possibility of disagreement among the circuits on the issue,141 the
Supreme Court might be disinclined to grant certiorari to cases
appealed from the District of Columbia or Sixth Circuits. 42
In the wake of Nestle and Freund, unions will be forced to change
their approach to handling work-related claims of employees during
the critical period. Considering that the District of Columbia Circuit
141. There are three possible scenarios, none of them likely to occur, through which
this issue could be heard by courts other than the District of Columbia or Sixth Circuits.
First, if the employer neither appeals the Board's ruling nor obeys the Board's order, the
Board could seek enforcement of its order in a circuit other than the District of Columbia
or Sixth Circuits, so long as the event at issue and the adverse party's residence or business
location are not exclusively in the District of Columbia or Sixth Circuits. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(e). Most employers would seek review in the District of Columbia Circuit rather
than wait for the NLRB to seek enforcement of its order in a circuit in which the outcome
is uncertain.
Second, the employer could appeal to a court other than the District of Columbia
or Sixth Circuits. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f). This alternative seems unlikely in light of the
employer's ability to choose the District of Columbia Circuit, which ruled favorably to
employers in Freund Baking Co. v. NLRB. See supra notes 117-36 and accompanying text
(discussing the Freund decision).
Finally, if the event at issue and the adverse party's residence or business location
are not exclusively in the District of Columbia or Sixth Circuits, and if the Board makes a
ruling favorable to the union concerning the provision of legal services before an election,
and if, in the same case, the Board makes a ruling adverse to the union on another matter,
then the union could appeal the case to an appeals court other than the District of
Columbia or Sixth Circuits. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(f). In this scenario, however, the
employer, who also has the right to appeal, would probably seek relief from the District of
Columbia Circuit. See id. When both parties seek review from different appeals courts
within ten days of the Board's ruling, a judicial panel randomly selects one of the courts to
hear the matter. 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a)(1)-(3) (1994).
This scenario occurred when both parties sought review of the decision in
Southwest Gas Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. No. 171, 2000 WL 389448 (Apr. 11, 2000). The
employer, petitioning for review in the District of Columbia Circuit, objected to the
Board's certification of the union, which had won a representation election. The employer
argued that, under Freund and Nestle Ice Cream, the union had impermissibly intervened
in the pending merger between the employer and another corporation. The union,
seeking review in the Ninth Circuit, objected to the Board's ruling that denied the union
reimbursement of its attorneys' fees. A judicial panel randomly selected the Ninth Circuit
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a)(1)-(3). The parties later settled the matter, and the court
dismissed the case pursuant to Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure on
August 9,2000. Stipulation of Dismissal at 1-2, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB (9th
Cir. 2000) (Nos. 00-70433, 00-70645) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Order
Filed Granting Joint Motion to Dismiss, August 9, 2000 (Public Access to Court
Electronic Records document) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
If appeals are filed after the ten-day period, then the first party to appeal decides
the forum. Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal
Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679,706 & n.146 (1989).
142. The Board maintains its right to continue to disagree with appeals court decisions
that contradict the Board's policy on labor issues of national scope, even when the Board
decides not to seek Supreme Court review of a case. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 141,
at 706.
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has a virtual lock on the issue, unions will probably avoid financing
any employees' suits until after a valid election has taken place.
Private attorneys who wish to represent employees during the critical
period will have to work out payment arrangements with the
employees, or work on a contingency-fee basis. Nestle and Freund
effectively prohibit those lawsuits that private attorneys are unwilling
to litigate without union financial backing.143
Because unions will need to formulate alternative strategies to
filing lawsuits during the critical period, three possibilities are offered
here. One method is to make a campaign promise' 44 to file a post-
election lawsuit if employees elect the union.145  At least two
problems confront this strategy, however. First, an employer might
argue that the union's preparation of the lawsuit during the critical
period constitutes an impermissible grant of benefits. 46  Second,
unions might be unable to counter the argument that they possess
total or near-total control over the promise to file a suit and that
therefore the representation election should be set aside. 47
A second alternative, untested in court proceedings, is to file a
lawsuit against the employer before a petition for a representation
election has been submitted.'" Under the Board's "critical period"
doctrine, in its determination of whether to set aside the results of
an election, the Board will consider only those allegedly improper
acts that occur during the critical period. 5 ' The theory underlying the
143. Telephone Interview with David M. Prouty, Southern Regional Counsel, Union of
Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE) (Mar. 20,2000).
144. For a discussion of the rationale behind permissible and impermissible promises,
see supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
145. This practice was upheld by the Federal Labor Relations Authority, the NLRB
analogue that governs federal employees. See FDIC, 38 F.L.R.A. 952, 962-63 (1990)
(refusing to set aside an election after the union promised, if elected, to file a lawsuit
against the employer challenging employees' temporary status).
146. The Board noted this problem in Novotel N.Y., 321 N.L.R.B. 624, 638-39 (1996).
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
147. In at least one case, the Board determined that a union's promises during the
critical period impermissibly influenced voters. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 261 N.L.R.B.
125, 126-27 (1982) (setting aside an election after a union flier stated that union
membership was a "definite advantage [in] ... securing a job if unemployed" because the
union maintained significant control over union hiring hall practices).
148. In Novotel, the employer asserted at oral argument before the Board that filing a
suit before the critical period might constitute impermissible conduct. 321 N.L.R.B. at
638.
149. For a definition of the critical period, see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
150. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 453,453-54 (1962) (citing the Board's
definition of this period in Ideal Elec. & Mfg. Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 1275, 1278 (1961)). The
Board and courts regularly have invoked the Ideal Electric rule. E.g., Torbitt &
Castleman, Inc. v. NLRB, 123 F.3d 899, 907-08 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that an employer's
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doctrine is that "the possibility of improper coercion or influence on
employee choice is then at its highest, thus justifying special scrutiny
of employer actions."'' The critical period doctrine does not apply,
however, in cases in which the court determines that the effects of
actions that occurred before an election petition have not sufficiently
dissipated by the election date. 2 The Tenth Circuit has interpreted
program of soliciting employee grievances did not taint the representation election
because the program began before the critical period and was implemented to increase
work productivity); Taber Partners I v. NLRB, Nos. 95-4166, 95-4202, 1996 WL 285784, at
*1 (2d Cir. May 29, 1996) (noting that alleged incidents of impermissible union coercion
cannot be considered in determining the validity of an election because the incidents
occurred before the critical period); NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 803 F.2d 345, 347-
48 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that purported union threats did not create a "fearful climate
which the Board or the courts have found to be grounds for setting aside an election"
because the threats occurred before the critical period); Crown Cork & Seal Co., 308
N.L.R.B. 445, 456 (1992) (ruling that allegedly improper anti-union speeches made by
employer before the critical period could not be the basis of voiding election results),
vacated on other grounds, 36 F.3d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Kellwood Co., 299 N.L.R.B. 1026,
1036 (1990) (holding that, because the employer's alleged threat to close the plant if the
union won the election occurred before the critical period, the union could not use that
event as a basis for invalidating the election).
151. NLRB v. Wis-Pak Foods, Inc., 125 F.3d 518,521 (7th Cir. 1997); see also NLRB v.
Lawrence Typographical Union No. 570, 376 F.2d 643, 652 (10th Cir. 1967) (noting that
"conduct too remote to have prevented [employees] the free choice guaranteed by [the
NLRA]" should be excluded from consideration).
152. E.g., Wis-Pak Foods, 125 F.3d at 521, 525-26 (observing that the Board considers
the effects of actions that occur outside the critical period when they "add meaning or
context to the days and weeks leading up to the election" and holding that the employer's
steep wage increase after an election lost and contested by the union could impermissibly
influence a possible follow-up election); NLRB v. Anchorage Times Publ'g Co., 637 F.2d
1359, 1364-65 (9th Cir. 1980) (enforcing a Board order adverse to the employer after the
employer committed unfair labor practices before the critical period that had substantial
effects up to the moment of the election); NLRB v. R. Dakin & Co., 477 F.2d 492,494 (9th
Cir. 1973) (refusing to enforce a Board order on the ground that the Board had erred in
"mechanically" applying the critical period doctrine, when the alleged pre-critical period
misconduct raised a material issue that affected the validity of a representation election);
Lawrence Typographical, 376 F.2d at 652-53 (denying enforcement of a Board order that
the union cease picketing after the employer had granted super-seniority to strike
replacement workers before a petition for a decertification election, reasoning that the
grant's effect of encouraging non-strikers to decertify the union did not dissipate by the
time of the vote); Am. Freightways, Inc., 327 N.L.R.B. No. 154, 1999-2000 NLRB Dec.
(CCH) 15,092 (Mar. 12, 1999) (setting aside an election after the employer initiated,
before the critical period, a series of employee meetings that continued into the critical
period); Classic Coach, 319 N.L.R.B. 701, 706 (1995) (invalidating an election because of
the employer's pre-critical period threat to close the business, combined with other acts of
intimidation during the critical period); Advo Sys., Inc., 297 N.L.R.B. 926, 930 n.3 (1990)
(voiding an election on the ground that the employer's "attendance policy review
committee," although formed before the critical period, "continually existed as an
instrument to defeat the union drive into and beyond the critical period when the new
attendance policy was actually adopted"); Fruehauf Corp., 274 N.L.R.B. 403, 412 (1985)
(invalidating an election after a union agent's threat before the critical period that
573
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the doctrine not as a statute of limitations on unfair labor practices,
but rather as a rule of evidence that allows the Board and courts to
"render irrelevant" conduct before the critical period that is too
attenuated to have affected employees' free choice in the
representation election.' The validity of filing a suit before the
critical period, therefore, might turn on the length of time that elapses
between the initiation of the suit and the request for a representation
election. Accordingly, courts might adopt a case-by-case approach in
lieu of declaring a bright-line rule of temporality.1
4
employees who crossed the picket line might be shot generated rumors and fears that
interfered with employees' freedom of choice); Baker Mach. & Gear, Inc., 220 N.L.R.B.
194, 207-08 (1975) (ordering the employer to bargain with the union notwithstanding the
union's loss in the representation election because the employer's acts before the critical
period, including the firing of four pro-union employees, were so egregious as to make a
free election impossible); Weather Seal Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 1226, 1228-29 (1966) (setting
aside an election after the employer coercively interrogated employees, assisted a rival
union, and laid off pro-union employees-all before the critical period).
153. Anchorage Times, 637 F.2d at 1364-65 (citing NLRB v. R. Dakin & Co., 477 F.2d
492, 494 (9th Cir. 1973)).
154. A number of factors might lead an employer not to contest the validity of an
election won by a union that financed a lawsuit filed before (or even during) the critical
period. An employer who prevails in such an appeal would be left with a majority of
employees who voted for the union and who might be disenchanted with the employer's
efforts to overturn the election. Moreover, upon a determination that an election is
invalid, the Board typically orders a second election. If a majority of workers continue to
support the union, the employer might face both less cordial relations with its employees
and a more determined union leadership than if the employer had accepted the results of
the first election. Telephone Interview with Nicholas W. Clark, Assistant General
Counsel, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union (Oct. 13, 2000); see
also Freund Baking Co., 330 N.L.R.B. No. 13, 1999-2000 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 15,335
(Nov. 16, 1999) (ordering a second election after determining that the first election was
invalid). For a discussion of litigation subsequent to the Board's order of a second
election in this case, see supra note 126.
A strategy of filing union-supported suits prior to the certification period is
compatible with a long-term approach to organizing employees. This approach might
focus on organizing around the needs of employees at a particular workplace and
encouraging worker empowerment and a sense of ownership of the union. Typically,
under this strategy, a substantial amount of time elapses between the filing of a lawsuit
and a petition for an election. For discussions of this approach, see Christopher David
Ruiz Cameron, The Labyrinth of Solidarity: Why the Future of the American Labor
Movement Depends on Latino Workers, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1089, 1104-15 (1999);
Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, the Workplace
Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 428-37
(1995). In contrast, under the traditional model of employee organizing, in which the goal
is to certify the union as representative in a relatively short time period, filing lawsuits
before the critical period might be difficult because the length of time between filing suit
and petitioning for an election tends to be shorter. For a discussion of the traditional
model, see Marion Crain, Feminism, Labor, and Power, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1819, 1837-43
(1992).
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Finally, the establishment of a legal foundation, unaffiliated with
unions, that advocates on behalf of employees could provide legal
advocacy to workers with job-related claims during the critical
period. 5 Because the organization would have no legal ties to the
union seeking to represent employees in the workplace, no party
would have a valid claim of impermissible influence over the election.
This alternative would provide the surest and safest avenue for
vindication of workers' rights during the critical period.
MICHAEL CARLIN
155. Such a foundation would be the union equivalent of such organizations as the
Right To Work Legal Defense Foundation and the Council on Labor Law Equality, two
groups that take anti-union positions on issues of employment and labor law. For
examples of cases in which these organizations represented or filed amicus briefs on behalf
of parties, see Prescott v. County of El Dorado, 204 F.3d 984, 984 (9th Cir. 2000);
Production Workers Union of Chicago and Vicinity, Local 707 v. NLRB, 161 F.3d 1047,
1048 (7th Cir. 1998); International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. NLRB, 133
F.3d 1012, 1014 (7th Cir. 1998); Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355, 1359 (D.C. Cir.
1983); M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. No. 173, 2000 WL 1274024, at *6 (Aug. 25, 2000);
Local 74, Service Employees International Union, 323 N.L.R.B. 289, 291 (1997); Novotel
N.Y., 321 N.L.R.B. 624,628-29 (1996).
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